Information frictions in the labor market
I am a fifth year Ph.D student in Economics at Sciences Po Paris and CREST under the supervision of Pierre Cahuc and Jean-Marc Robin.
My main interests lie in applied and macro labor economics.
My research focuses on information frictions in the labor market, from both the demand and the supply side.
Demand side
Firms' imperfect information at the wage-posting stage: do recruiters know the wages posted by competing firms?
Supply side
Job seekers' imperfect information about occupational mobility: do they know where to look?
Job market paper
Opportunity, taste or misinformation? How the unemployed choose which occupations to apply to (JMP)
Job seekers apply widely: most of their applications go to occupations other than the one they registered for. Experiments show that redirecting their search can be beneficial, which suggests they do not know well where to look. I ask how much imperfect information misallocates job seekers across occupations. Three forces direct search: opportunity (hiring chances and pay), taste, and imperfect information. I build a directed search model in which job seekers choose where to apply based on their tastes and on rational beliefs about their prospects, and employers decide whom to hire. I estimate the model with data from a major online job board that links applications to hires and wages. How applications respond to familiar versus unfamiliar occupations separates taste from imperfect information. The estimated model measures the welfare cost of imperfect information, and a planner's solution shows how much of the gap better information alone cannot close.
Other work in progress