Research
Job market paper
Opportunity, taste or misinformation? How the unemployed choose which occupations to apply to (JMP)
Job seekers apply widely: most of their applications go to occupations other than the one they registered for. Experiments show that redirecting their search can be beneficial, which suggests they do not know well where to look. I ask how much imperfect information misallocates job seekers across occupations. Three forces direct search: opportunity (hiring chances and pay), taste, and imperfect information. I build a directed search model in which job seekers choose where to apply based on their tastes and on rational beliefs about their prospects, and employers decide whom to hire. I estimate the model with data from a major online job board that links applications to hires and wages. How applications respond to familiar versus unfamiliar occupations separates taste from imperfect information. The estimated model measures the welfare cost of imperfect information, and a planner's solution shows how much of the gap better information alone cannot close.
Work in progress
How does providing labour-market information to employers at the job-posting stage change job postings and hiring outcomes? Experimental evidence from French employers.
Many firms report difficulties in filling vacancies. This project investigates whether this may be due to posted wages being too low relative to what the supply side expects, and whether recruiters are misinformed about the prevailing wage distribution. In collaboration with a major French job board, we evaluate the results of a randomised experiment that provides recruiters with information on local labour market wages at the job-posting stage. The intervention relies on an interactive tool, developed by the job board, which displays a vacancy’s posted wage position within the distribution of posted wages in the same local labour market. The results of this experiment will shed light on the extent to which recruiter misinformation about the wage distribution distorts both vacancy postings and the job-matching process.
Labor-Market Information, Job Postings, and Employer Beliefs: Experimental Evidence from Austria
Many firms report difficulties in filling vacancies. To study the importance of information frictions in the job posting process, we test the effect of giving employers information on the wages posted by competing firms. Together with the Austrian Public Employment Service, we field an employer survey linked to administrative employer–employee data. We embed a randomized information experiment that provides half of the recruiters with recent occupation-specific posted wages for the position most relevant to them. We measure belief updating and link it to subsequent stated and realised posting choices.
Wishing to Work More? Preferences, Constraints, and Hours Worked
Using data from the French Labor Force Survey, we show that 21.2% of workers experience an hours gap, meaning they work fewer hours than they would prefer at their current wage. This stands in sharp contrast to recent evidence from Germany, where most workers report being overworked. In France, hours gaps are concentrated among low-income part-time workers and remain stable over time. We argue that cross-country differences in labor market institutions — including minimum wage policies, working-time regulations, and unemployment insurance — are central to shaping both realized hours and the distribution of hours gaps. While hours gaps appear inefficient in standard labor supply models, they may reflect constrained-efficient outcomes in the presence of frictions. Understanding the mechanisms that generate hours gaps is crucial for evaluating the welfare effects of hours- based policy interventions.